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INDIANA L.4W JOURNAL
Most courts have agreed that a business advantage is an interest of
property;O and the instant case is in accord. The case is not, however,
without some difficulty. In the cases cited by the court, the results were
arrived at under the terms of specific statutory regulation."1 Apparently in
the jurisdictions of these cases their effectiveness was purely statutory and
12
failure to comply with the terms of the statutes would cut off equitable relief.
In the Uservo case no statute was cited and no allegations of compliance
appear in the opinion. Quaere, then, as to the authority of the Ohio and
Colorado decisions? There is also a further complication. An Indiana statute
deals directly with this situation.13 If the court's failure to mention the
statute is intentional, this case may provide an unusual opportunity for Indiana
to escape the dilemma and difficulties that have beset sister jurisdictions.14
Classical equitable jurisdiction was unfettered by the restrictions which ill
considered American decision have imposed,1 5 and there is no reason why
Indiana should follow the latter forever.
Does the approach of the court in the Uservo case suggest that in Indiana
we will with one bold stroke recognize "complete" jurisdiction which has
forever been equity's?' 6
W H. S.
MASTER AND SERVANT-TERMINATION

OF RELATION AFTER DISCHARGE.-Plain-

tiff, an employee, having been laid off, had checked his tools and had been
561, Edison v. Edison Polyform Co. (1907), 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 At. 392;
"cartoon characters," Fisher v. Star Pub. Co. (1921), 231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E.
133, "the writer's interest in letters of no literary value," Gee v. Pritchard
(1818), 2 Swans. 403, 36 Eng. Rep. 670; "business advantage protected, where
there was nothing in the case to show an actual threat of injury to property
but the court implied it," Beck v. Ry. Teamsters (1898), 118 Mich. Rep. 497,
77 N. W 13.
For further references, see: Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. R. 640; Fordham, Self Determination of
Equity, 30 Ill. L. R. 716, Extension of Equitable Jurisdiction beyond Protection
of Property Rights, 34 Harv. L. R. 407.
10 Dixon v. Holden (1869), 7 Eq. Cas. 488 (Eng.), Shoemaker v. The
South Bend Spark Arrester Co. (1893), 135 Ind. 471, 35 N. E. 280; Emack
v. Kane (1888), 34 Fed. 46, Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Myers (1908), 140 Ill.
App. 392; American Mercury v. Chase (1926), 13 F (2d) 224.
1 Denver etc. Exchange Inc. v. McKinzie (1930), 87 Colo. 379, 287 P
868, Renner Brewing Co. v Rolland (1917), 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 N. E. 118:
The result reached in these cases and the Indiana case seems to be in accord
with the great weight of authority on the point involved, 60 A. L. R. 285,
however, there is an interesting Utah case which is contra, Clover Leaf Dairy
Co. v. Van Gerven (1928), 269 P 1020, where the court denied relief, saying
in substance that "owners of trade-marked bottles, who permit them to go into
possession of customers without any atttmpt to hold the customers responsible
for their return, permitting the return of bottles unmarked or marked with
the trade-mark of others, cannot enjoin their use by rival merchants without
showing that they have not a like number of bottles of such merchants in their

possession."

See 60 A. L. R. 281.

12 Colorado Statutes, sec. 3078, 1930 (C. L.) , Ohio General Code, ss. 13169,
13169-1, 13169-2, 13169-3 These statutes pertain to the "Registration and Use
of Bottles, Trademarks and Tradenames."
1a 1933 Burns' Ann. St. sec. 66-101, ff.
14 Note 6, supra.
15 Note 6, supra.
16 See, Fordham, The Self Determination of Equity, 30 11. L. R. 716.

RECENT CASE NOTES
told by someone in the employment office to return the next day to receive his
pay. He was injured on the following day while en route to the factory to
collect his wages. Held, he could not recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as the provisions of the statute were not applicable, the employment
relation having terminated.1
As the provisions of the Workman's Compensation Act apply only where
an employment relation exists, 2 the court very properly first considered the
question whether such a relation still continued. In finding that there was
no employment relation, the court stated, "When appellant received the notice
that the employment was terminated and he had checked his tools and turned
in his badge, he was no longer subject to the orders of his master and the
relationship of master and servant ceased to exist."
The relation of master and servant does not necessarily cease with the
discharge of the employee, as might be gathered from the opinion of the
court in the principal case. Even the case upon which the court relied holds
that, "the period of the relationship covers a reasonable interval of time
for the employee to get his pay and to leave the premises." 3 Thus, it has
been held that where an employee was discharged and, having asked for his
identification tag, was assaulted, his injury occurred in the course of the
employment relation.4 Also, where the employee was injured in a coal mine
while gathering up his tools after he had been discharged, it was held that
the employment relation still existed.5 Although the courts seem to agree
that a discharge does not necessarily operate then and there to end the relation of master and servant, when presented with facts similar to those in the
principal case, they reach unharmonious results as to the existence of the
employment relation.
Where the employee has been discharged and later, according to instructions, comes back for his wages, the English courts take the position that the
employment relation is still in existence, and if the injury arises out of and in
the course of the employment the injury is compensable.6 The theory of this
position seems to be that in spite of the discharge, there is an implied
provision that the employment will include going to receive wages on the
appointed day.
In the only exactly similar case that has arisen in this country the New
York Supreme Court held that once the employee after discharge had left
the premises without receiving his pay, the only relation that exists between
the former employer and employee is one of creditor and debtor." In this
case the New York court reversed a holding of the Industrial Board that
lForman v. Chrysler Corporation (1936), - Ind. App. -, 2 N. E. (2d)
806.
2 Board of Commissioners of Wells County v. Merritt (1924), 81 Ind. App.
488, 143 N. E. 711.
3 Olson v. Hulbert-Sherman Hotel Co. (1924), 210 App. Div. 537, 206
N. Y. S. 427.
4 Zygmuntowicz v. American Steel Wire Co. of New Jersey (1922), 240
Mass. 421, 134 N. E. 385.
5 Mitchell v. Consolidated Coal Co. (1923), 195 Iowa 415, 192 N. W 145.
6 Riley v. William Holland & Sons Ltd. (1911), 1 K. B. 1029, 4 B. W C. C.
155..
7 Olson v. Hulbert-Sherman Hotel Co. (1924), 210 App. Div. 537, 206
N. Y. S. 427.
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returning to get wages was incidental to the employment. The New York
rule seems to be the exact antithesis of the English rule. The principal case
follows the New York rule.
If in the principal case the court had not adopted a rather narrow construction of a statute which by the weight of authority is to be liberally
construed,8 and had found that the employment relation still continued, it
would have been presented with the problem of whether or not that injury
arose out of and in the course of the employment.
0. E. G.
ACTION AGAINST PARTNERSHIP IN FIRM NAME-EFFECT OF GENERAL DENIAL.-

The plaintiff brought an action for money had and received against a
partnership, designating the defendants as "Thompson whose christian
name is unknown, and McKinnon whose christian name is unknown, doing
business under the style, and firm name of Thompson and McKinnon'
Service of process was made upon the office manager of the partnership of
Thompson and McKinnon in the description of the above caption. After a
filing and then a withdrawal of a special and limited appearance by fourteen
named and designated parties to quash the summons, the defendants answered
in general denial in the manner of the above caption. Evidence was excluded
of the death of a Mr. Thompson which occurred more than four years before
this cause of action accrued. From a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff
against the defendant named as above, the defendant appealed. Held, that
the judgment was contrary to law in that the individual partners were not
sufficient designated, and that it was reversible error to have excluded the
above evidence; new trial granted.1
The well known common law rule that a partnership cannot be sued in
the firm name alone, but that the individual names of the members thereof
must be set out in the complaint was early adopted in Indiana. 2 This rule has
been continually followed in actions against a partnership as a type of business
organization.3 In this respect it is consistent with the status of the law in the
majority of the states, 4 except where recent statutes have enabled unincorporated
associations to sue and be sued in the association name. The reason for
the rule is to render judicial proceedings certain and conclusive as between
the parties, and to give full force and effect to the doctrine of res judicata.
However, not only have recent statutes in several jurisdictions changed this
common law rule, but also there are many states which have changed it
without the aid of a statute by recognizing the partnership as a legal entity
for the purposes of suing and being sued. 5 Probably the first case to go this
8 In re Duncan (1920), 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289; Birdsell Mfg.
Co. v. Tripp (1923), 80 Ind. App. 450, 141 N. E. 252; Clark v. Woods (1933),
95 Ind. App. 530, 183 N. E. 804.
1Thompson v. Corn (1936), 200 N. E. 737 (Ind. App.).
2 Hays v. Lanier (1833), 3 Blackf. 322 (Ind.).
SLivingston v. Harvey (1858), 10 Ind. 218, Adams Express Co. v. Hill
(1873), 43 Ind. 157, Pollock v. Dunning.(1876), 54 Ind. 115, Karges Furniture
Co. v. Amalgamated Union (1905), 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877
4 Conn v. Sellers (1917), 198 Ala. 606, 73 So. 961, Hotchkiss v. Di Vita
(1925), 103 Conn. 436, 136 At. 668, International Harvester Co. v. ClementsMiddleton Co. (1931), 35 S. W
(2d) 462 (Tex. Civ. Appeals), Pope v.
State (1935), 86 S. W (2d) 475 (Tex. Civ. Appeals); Wilson v. Guess Dry
Cleaning Co. (1934), 5 Fed. Supp. 762 (Miss.).
5 Johnson v. Smith (1841), Morris Reports 105 (Iowa) , People v. Zangain

